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Abstract
Much of the time, firms lobby against environmental protection, but there are major
exceptions to this rule. DuPont, the leading ozone polluter in the 1980s, lobbied for a
complete ban of its product. In 2015, in the run up to the Paris Agreement, Europe’s
six largest oil and gas companies lobbied for a global carbon price. This kind of political
support is often pivotal for governments trying to protect the environment. I offer an
explanation for this phenomenon, suggesting firms behave as they do in order to steal
market share from their rivals. I develop a simple model in which a polluting firm makes
a clean technology investment and then lobbies successfully for strong environmental
protection, since this will shift market share away from its rival who has not made the
clean investment. The key result is that there are situations where it is only because
of firms’ lobbying that environmental protection is achieved, and this raises welfare.
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1 Introduction
This paper aims to answer the question ‘when might polluting firms support environmental
protection, and what difference does this make?’ Lack of political support is a major reason
why environmental regulations are either delayed or permanently weak.1 Political support
for environmental protection can come from a number of places, but it is arguably most
valuable when it comes from business. Many environmental policymakers would go so far as
to say that this is almost a necessary condition for feasible environmental regulation - when
there appears to be conflict between ‘the economy’ and the environment, the environment
tends to lose.2
Firms spend significant resources on lobbying3 and there is a general perception that
polluting firms inevitably use their lobbying power to slow down, water down, or entirely
block measures to protect the environment. This is indeed the case much of the time,4 but
there have been major and important exceptions to this rule. The following two examples
motivate much of the paper.
The first is an unusually clear-cut case concerning protection of the ozone layer, the
biggest environmental problem of its time. During the 1980s, regulators were attempting to
draw up global rules to limit the production of ozone-depleting CFCs and encourage invest-
ment in cleaner alternatives. Until 1988, the major ozone-polluting firms had all opposed
environmental regulation and successfully used their influence to limit protection of the ozone
layer. The largest producer, US firm DuPont, had lobbied for decades against regulation, for
example warning the US Senate that restrictions were unnecessary and would cause ‘tremen-
1Oates and Portney (2003) review the literature on the political economy of environmental protection.
2Stern (2015).
3For example, in the US, energy and fossil fuel companies spent $0.54 billion on lobbying over the 2013-14
Congress (according to the Center for Responsive Politics, opensecret.org, accessed on 29 Jan 2015). The
EU is far less transparent, so financial flows are hard to obtain, but according to Dinan and Wesselius (2010)
there are perhaps 30,000 lobbyists in Brussels, the same as the number of EU Commission employees.
4Oreskes (2010) details attempts to block environmental protection by polluting firms.
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dous economic dislocation’.5 However, in March 1988 DuPont abruptly announced that it
no longer opposed regulation and in fact now wanted a complete phase-out of global CFC
production. DuPont’s new political support for regulation is widely seen as the key turning
point in the story of ozone protection.6 The European producers continued to lobby against
reductions but were unsuccessful: the Montreal Protocol, and a series of subsequent treaties,
achieved a total phase out of CFCs. It has been suggested that DuPont’s lobbying for regula-
tion may have been in its economic self interest. Since it had already made some investments
in cleaner production technologies that would give it an advantage over its rivals in the clean
substitute market, DuPont potentially stood to gain market share.7 In the words of DuPont
director Joseph Glass, ‘when you have $3 billion of CFCs sold worldwide and 70 percent of
that is about to be regulated out of existence, there is tremendous market potential.’8 A
key feature of DuPont’s lobbying was for controls to be as strong and as international as
possible, so that their major European rivals would be affected.
The DuPont example is perhaps particularly straightforward, but similar dynamics are
also likely to be operating on various levels in the more complex case of climate change. In
the run up to the Paris Agreement, a coalition of major oil and gas producers was among
those calling for the introduction of a global carbon price. Europe’s six largest oil and gas
companies (BG, BP, Eni, Shell, Statoil and Total) argued in an open letter to the UN sent
on 29 May 2015 for the introduction of a carbon price. If this were introduced, they argued,
they could invest in reducing their emissions by, for example, increasing the proportion of gas
they produce (which is relatively clean). The letter also hints at another effect of the carbon
price: ‘reduced demand for the most carbon intensive fossil fuels’ - that is, coal, their biggest
5Benedick (1998) gives a definitive and first hand account of the history of ozone protection, as he was
the lead US negotiator for the Montreal Protocol.
6See Barrett (2003) for further details.
7DuPont probably had several reasons for making this move; all that is argued here is that profit is likely
to have been one of them. Smith (1998) gives a detailed discussion of DuPont’s potential motives.
8Quoted in Gilding (2012).
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competitor product, with a market share of global energy supply around 30%.9 A moderately
strong carbon price would almost certainly shift market share away from coal and towards
gas, creating, in the words of the DuPont director, ‘tremendous market potential’. It is hard
not to see this lobbying, at least in part, as an attempt by the oil and gas companies to steal
market share from the coal companies.10 Although climate regulation is on-going, stronger
political support from the private sector is considered by many policy makers to have helped
achieve the Paris Agreement in 2015.11
Hence there are clear examples of major polluting firms lobbying for environmental reg-
ulation of their markets, and this political support can substantially increase the ability of
governments to protect the environment.12 This paper asks, by modelling these kinds of
situations, when and how a firm like DuPont might choose to invest in a costly clean tech-
nology, knowing it will be able to influence the political process to get regulations passed
that will result in increased market share and so greater profits.
An outline of the model and results presented here is as follows. In the baseline model
there are two identical firms, each of which can invest in a new green production technology
or keep their old polluting technology. A government then chooses the emissions tax they
are subject to, and the firms can influence this choice through lobbying. The result is
that, for a region of the model’s parameter space, competition between the firms causes one
9IEA Key World Energy Statistics (2014).
10This lobbying probably had multiple aims. For example, by participating actively in the political process
of carbon pricing, the oil and gas companies might be able to keep the carbon price from being too much
higher than they would like, or by sorting it out sooner rather than later, they might be able to reduce
uncertainty around long run demand for their product. It may also have been to improve the public image of
these companies. All that is argued here is that stealing market share from coal could be one of the reasons
for this kind of lobbying.
11For example, Nicholas Stern’s response to the Paris Agreement included: ‘... businesses have been
strongly represented at the Paris climate change summit and have played an important role in urging
governments to achieve a strong agreement.’ (New Climate Economy, newclimateeconomy.net, accessed on
29 Jan 2016.)
12Barrett (1992) details other instances of this kind of behaviour. For example, in response to concerns over
the environmental impact of phosphates, the German firm Henkel invested in a phosphate-free detergent,
lobbied for controls and gained market share in France and Germany in the 1980s. More generally, this
process need not be limited to environmental regulation.
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firm to choose to go green and lobby for strong environmental protection, so that it gains
market share in the new regulated market, while the other keeps the old technology and
opposes environmental regulation. The lobbying results in the equilibrium emissions tax
being distorted above the Pigouvian level, and increasingly so as the government becomes
more open to lobbying. The key result concerns the interaction between the political process
and firms’ green investment choices: there are situations where it is only because a firm can
lobby, and therefore secure strong environmental protection, that it will see it as worthwhile
to go green. At the same time, it is only because of a firm’s political support that the
government can take environmental action. Lobbying can therefore induce a transition to a
greener economy.
This is the key result of the paper, but I go on to make five further points. First, for
other regions of the parameter space (for example, when environmental damage is higher,
or green investment costs lower), both firms choose to go green in equilibrium instead of
just one. Here, although no lobbying conflict is observed over market share between the
firms, the threat of loss of market share if a firm doesn’t go green, intensified by lobbying,
helps to sustain the equilibrium. Second, the welfare implications of these two types of
lobbying-induced transitions to a greener economy are characterised, and I show that if
lobbying induces a transition then it must also be welfare improving. Third, the model can
be generalised to the case of n firms and variants of all the key results developed in the two
firm case continue to hold, though now with coalitions of green and brown firms. The two
firm model is therefore appropriate for examining situations with more than two firms, so
the bulk of the paper focuses on this simpler set up. Fourth, the results are robust to various
different product market assumptions. However, the extent to which lobbying makes the
green investment more attractive to firms falls as demand becomes more elastic, because the
market share effect is partially offset by the total market shrinking. Fifth, I discuss three
reasons why lobbying-induced transitions to a greener economy are not always observed in
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practice.
The findings presented here are related to three broad strands of the economics literature.
First, the paper sits within the wide literature on the political economy of environmental
regulation. Stigler (1971) argued that across the economy regulation is ultimately largely
the result of profit seeking by firms. Buchanan and Tullock (1975) pointed out that different
environmental regulations often vary substantially in their distributional consequences, and
suggested that firms will ensure the regulations that are chosen are those that most increase
their profits. Barrett (1991) argues environmental regulation can give some firms competitive
advantage, and that those firms will therefore attempt to get those regulations introduced.
These early papers remain highly relevant today, though they lack a mechanism that ex-
plains how firms influence policy. Grossman and Helpman (1994) were the first to apply the
common agency model of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) to lobbying, an approach that has
now become standard.13 Aidt (1998) and Fredriksson (1997) first applied it to environmental
policy making, showing that an environmental lobby group can counter the influence of a
polluters’ lobby group and thereby bring about environmental protection. This remains an
active and productive area of research: Damania (2001) shows that polluting firms can use
dirty investments as a commitment device to aid their lobbying efforts; Eliste and Fredriks-
son (2002) look at the relationship between trade and environmental regulation when firms
can lobby; Wilson and Damania (2005) explore the environmental impact of corruption at
different levels of government; MacKenzie and Ohndorf (2012) show that lobbying consider-
ations may, counterintuitively, make non-revenue raising environmental regulation the most
preferred option for governments; Habla and Winkler (2013) show how national lobbying can
play an important role in international environmental agreements. A feature common to all
13Lobbying can alternatively be thought of as a process of information transmission, and therefore an
application of Crawford and Sobel (1982)’s model of strategic information transmission. Which of the two
types of lobbying takes place in reality is context dependent (see Grossman and Helpman (2001) for a
discussion). This paper focuses on buying influence.
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these papers is that polluting firms will always lobby against environmental protection: for
the externality to be adequately controlled, a lobby group with environmental preferences
is needed. The model presented here, therefore, offers a complementary explanation of the
political processes behind environmental regulation, by showing how environmental protec-
tion can sometimes be achieved even in the absence of a lobby group that cares about the
environment.
The second strand of literature this paper relates to is the Porter Hypothesis (the idea
that firms often gain rather than lose from environmental regulation). The model gives rise
to a version of the Porter Hypothesis without relaxing any of the optimising assumptions of
standard economic theory.14 Hence it suggests a new mechanism that can give rise to this
familiar result.
Third, this model also shares various features with those in the literature on competitive
R&D and endogenous technical change. In the competitive R&D literature,15 firms under-
take R&D in an imperfectly competitive market because doing so brings them a competitive
advantage, usually lower relative costs, allowing them to gain market share. The approach
taken here can be thought of as an extension of this literature by modelling two sequential
investment choices. First, a standard R&D investment (in clean technology) that impacts
firms’ relative costs; second, a political investment (in a high emissions tax) that is highly
complementary to the R&D. Looked at in this way, it is the complementarity of the invest-
ments that means that when offered together they will be undertaken, whereas in isolation
they may not. Finally, this paper is relevant to the current literature on endogenous techni-
cal change.16 For example, Acemoglu et al. (2016) present and estimate a dynamic model in
14Porter and Linde (1995) give the original statement of the argument, which holds that ‘$10 bills are
waiting to be picked up’, that is, in reality firms are not profit maximising. Other explanations consistent
with optimising behaviour are based on market power, asymmetric information and R&D spillovers (see
Ambec et al. (2013)).
15See, for example, Reinganum (1983).
16See, among others, Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Aghion et al. (2016).
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which formerly polluting producers choose between investments in clean or dirty production
methods. In the absence of significant R&D subsidies, very high carbon taxes are needed for
the transition to clean technologies. The present paper can be seen as complementing this
literature, by offering one explanation for how such taxes can be politically achieved.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the baseline model is
presented. Section 3 contains the key results: equilibria are characterised and discussed.
In Section 4 examines the welfare consesquences of the results. In Section 5 the model is
generalised to n firms, and robustness is considered. Section 6 concludes with a discussion
of three potential reasons why the predictions of the model don’t always hold in reality.
2 The baseline model
The baseline model contains two firms and a single government who play a three stage
game. First the firms choose whether or not to invest in costly, but emissions-free production
technology. Then in the second stage the government sets an emissions tax, which the firms
attempt to influence through lobbying. In the third stage firms produce and earn profits.
2.1 The economy
There are two firms, 1 and 2. Each firm i ∈ {1, 2} produces a quantity xi of a single
homogenous good. They each face an initial choice over their production technology fi ∈
{G,B}. They can choose the clean, or ‘green’, production technology fi = G, in which case
production by the firm results in no emissions. Alternatively they can choose the dirty, or
‘brown’, production technology fi = B, in which case production is polluting and each unit
of output results in a unit of emissions. Choosing fi = G requires the firm to spend s > 0 on
investment in the new green technology. This could represent the building of a new factory
or power station, some kind of R&D, or any other step to reduce emissions. Choosing fi = B
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is free, reflecting the idea that the current technology is polluting and can continue to be
used with no new investment required. Note that the cost structure of the firms is otherwise
unaffected by this investment choice; the only purpose of investing in clean technology is to
reduce emissions to zero.17 Each firm has emissions per unit of output ei given by:
ei(fi) =

0 if fi = G
1 if fi = B
(1)
The firms face an emissions tax τ , resulting in a tax bill of τeixi. From the firm’s point of
view, the green investment can be thought of simply as a way to switch off emissions tax
τ .18
The firms have identical and strictly convex production costs. Specifically, assume they
have costs given by 1
2
kx2i , where for analytical simplicity I normalise k to
1
2
.19 Given any
pair of technology choices by the two firms f ∈ {G,B}2 and emissions tax τ , each firm i
chooses output xi to maximise profits from production, given by:
pii(xi | τ, f) = pxi − 1
4
x2i − τeixi (2)
17In reality investment in new green technology does often have an impact on marginal cost, pushing it
either up or down, and this can be a major investment incentive. Abstracting away from this allows the
paper to isolate a separate reason for green investments.
18Given the set up of this model, the first best outcome would involve the government using an investment
subsidy to reach the efficient outcome. The assumption here is that such a subsidy is not available, reflecting
the fact that investment subsidies are rarely used to solve environmental problems - subsidies, taxes or quotas
on outputs or inputs (together with performance standards) tend to be the instruments used in practice -
even when the policy goal is to encourage investment.
19The only assumption here important for the results is that costs must be strictly convex, of which
quadratic is the simplest, and
∑
ki = 1 gives the simplest analytical solutions. If firms have non-convex
costs then the government would face no interesting tradeoffs following f = (G,B); it would always simply
set the tax to push the brown firm entirely out of the market.
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The market structure is as follows. Demand is linear and given by:
x = 1− bp (3)
where x = x1 + x2, and b ≥ 0. Many of the proofs and examples will begin with the case
where b = 0, that is where demand is inelastic and equal to 1. Fixing the total size of the
market in this way generates simple analytical solutions that are useful for understanding
how competition for market share drives the key results. This low elasticity benchmark is
then contrasted with a high elasticity case.
The second product market assumption is that firms are price takers. This ensures there
is no strategic behaviour at the production stage, and so allows the model to focus cleanly
on the strategic interactions between the firms at the investment and lobbying stages.20 The
results are robust to this assumption: in Appendix A.4 the model is resolved for Cournot
competition, giving qualitatively equivalent but analytically less tractable results. The price
taking assumption also fits naturally with the n firm generalisation of the model presented
in Section 5.1.
2.2 The political process
After the investment choices have been made, the emissions tax τ is set by a government
with two aims: to maximise social welfare and to collect political donations from lobbyists.
Social welfare W is the utility of a representative citizen plus the impact of environmental
damage. Demand curve (3) implies that the representative citizen has quasilinear utility of
20Any assumption other than price taking will lead to production market failures, and the government
will therefore use the emissions tax partly as an instrument of competition policy, which would not be a
desirable feature of the model.
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the form u(x, y) = 1
b
(x− 1
2
x2)+y, where y is wealth (or consumption of a numeraire good).21
Wealth y is equal to total profits (pi1 + pi2), minus expenditure on x (px), plus emissions tax
revenue (τ
∑
eixi). Environmental damage is given by η
∑
eixi, where η ≥ 0 gives marginal
environmental damage.22 Combining the above gives welfare:23
W (x, τ, f) =
1
b
(x− 1
2
x2) +
∑
pii − px+ τ
∑
eixi − η
∑
eixi (4)
The government also cares about political contributions c1 and c2 from the two firms, who
lobby the government over the level of τ . Bernheim and Whinston (1986) give an analysis
of games of common agency, which Grossman and Helpman (1994) apply to lobbying, and
I follow this now standard approach here. The problem is one of two firms (the principals)
attempting to influence the actions of the government (the common agent). They do this
through lobbying, which is represented by a contribution function Ci(τ) specifying how much
firm i will pay as a political donation to the government for each level of τ . The government
therefore seeks to maximise W (τ) + λ(C1(τ) + C2(τ)), where λ ≥ 0 determines the relative
weight the government gives to political contributions compared to social welfare. λ is the
openness to lobbying of the government: λ = 0 represents an incorruptible government only
interested in social welfare; as λ rises the government and its policies become increasingly
21The above utility function is not defined for b = 0. A complete specification of the utility function
for all b ≥ 0 implied by demand equation (3) is: u(x, y) =
{
1
b (x− 12x2) + y if b > 0
v(x) + y if b = 0
, where v(x) ={
0 if x = 1
−∞ if x 6= 1. This discontinuity in the utility function does not affect any real quantities in the economy,
even for b = 0, because demand is continuous at b = 0. It matters only when calculating welfares in Section 4.
A final assumption when inferring this quasilinear utility function from linear demand is that the consumer
always has enough wealth to choose her ideal level of x, that is we have an interior solution to her utility
maximisation problem.
22Linear environmental damage is likely to be a realistic assumption only for emissions within a limited
range: most environmental damage functions are ultimately convex (see Ackerman et al. (2009) for a dis-
cussion). However the qualitative nature of the results would be the same in either case, so the simplest
specification is used here.
23When b = 0 the utility component of this welfare equation is given by relevant part of footnote 21.
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‘for sale’. This paper focuses on the case where λ is close to but not quite equal to 0, which
(hopefully) represents many modern economies.24
2.3 The overall game
Combining the above components, the model can be summarised as a three stage game:
Stage 1: Investment
• Each firm i simultaneously chooses production technology fi ∈ {G,B}.
Stage 2: Lobbying
• Each firm i simultaneously chooses contribution function Ci(τ),
• The government then chooses emissions tax τ ∈ R.
Stage 3: Production
• Each firm i simultaneously chooses output xi ∈ R≥0.
• Prices are taken as given, the market clears, and each firm i earns profits pii.
Payoffs at the end of the game for government and firms are
Ugov = W + λ(c1 + c2) (5)
Ui = pii − ci − s(1− ei) for each i ∈ {1, 2} (6)
24Goldberg and Maggi (1999), among many others, estimate Grossman and Helpman’s trade protection
model. They estimate, for the US, openness to lobbying λ to be positive but small, around λ = 0.02.
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3 Equilibria
The relevant solution concept for a sequential game of this kind is the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium.25 It is found by backward induction, starting at stage 3.
Stage 3: Production
Taking as given the investment choice f and emissions tax τ chosen earlier in the game,
each firm maximises profits (2) and prices adjust so that supply equals demand (3). This
gives, for each firm i ∈ {1, 2}, equilibrium output x∗i (τ, f), price p∗(τ, f) and profits pi∗i (τ, f)
(13) as a function of choices made earlier in the game. Appendix A.1 contains a complete
summary of the analytical solutions to this and subsequent stages of the game.
Given the symmetry of the two firms, there are three different technology choices to
consider: f ∈ {(G,G), (G,B), (B,B)}.26 The production subgame following f = (G,G)
is the simplest. Both firms have made the clean technology investment, so produce no
emissions: ei = 0. The emissions tax therefore has no effect, and output is high and split
evenly between the two firms.
Next, consider the (G,B) investment, where one firm goes green by investing in the
clean technology and the other stays brown by keeping the old technology. Denote, with
some abuse of notation, outcomes for the firm that chose fi = G with a subscript G, and
outcomes for the firm that chose fi = B with a subscript B. The green firm causes no
emissions, eG = 0, but the brown firm continues to pollute, eB = 1, and so must pay
emissions tax τ for every unit of production. This gives interior27 equilibrium output, price
25Throughout the paper, I restrict my attention to pure strategies only.
26Because the two firms are ex ante identical, the (G,B) and (B,G) outcomes are equivalent.
27The solution to the game will be an interior equilibrium if, given the tax rate, each firm chooses non-
negative production. We will see a corner solution following (G,B) if the tax is pushed up to the point
where the brown firm ceases production. Throughout the main text I focus on the interior solution, with
the corner solution given in Appendix A.5.
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and profits, which depend on the emissions tax τ as follows:
d
dτ
x∗G(τ, (G,B)) > 0,
d
dτ
x∗B(τ, (G,B)) < 0,
d
dτ
p∗(τ, (G,B)) > 0, (7)
d
dτ
pi∗G(τ, (G,B)) > 0,
d
dτ
pi∗B(τ, (G,B)) < 0,
d
dτ
∑
pi∗i (τ, (G,B)) > 0 (8)
Increasing the emissions tax τ has two effects on the goods market: shifting market share
from the brown firm to the green firm, and increasing the price. The green firm would like
a high emissions tax τ since it will gain both market share and the environmental rents
contained in the price rise. These gains to the green firm can be thought of as a kind of first
mover advantage. Similarly the brown firm would like a low τ since this lowers its loss of
market share, and limits the fall in its net of tax price. The sum of profits is increasing in τ
since production is shifted to the firm receiving a higher net of tax price. This means that
the green firm benefits more from an emissions tax increase than the brown firm loses. This
result is an important feature of this production subgame, and one that will underpin many
of the final results, so is summarised in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Following investment f = (G,B), total profits are increasing in the emissions
tax τ , d
dτ
∑
pi∗i (τ, (G,B)) > 0. That is, the green firm gains more from increasing τ than the
brown firm loses.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
Finally, consider f = (B,B). Both firms keep the old technology, so both pay emissions
tax τ . The firms produce equal output x∗B(τ, (B,B)) and earn profits pi
∗
B(τ, (B,B)). For
any b > 0, both output and profits decrease as the government increases the emissions tax,
which shrinks total output in the usual way. For b = 0, demand is inelastic, so total output
is fixed, and the tax has no effect on each firm’s output or profits.
Stage 2: Lobbying
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In this stage, each firm seeks to influence the emissions tax, while the government balances
its two objectives of maximising social welfare and collecting political contributions from
each firm. Following the common agency approach of Bernheim and Whinston (1986), this
situation is characterised by the decision of a single agent (the government) affecting two
principals (the firms). Each firm announces a contribution function Ci(τ) which specifies
how much it will donate to the government for any level of τ that might be chosen.28 Each
firm designs its contribution function Ci(τ) to encourage the government to distort the tax
in the direction that increases its own profits. The government observes the contribution
functions and chooses τ to maximise W (τ) + λ
∑
Ci(τ).
An outcome of this lobbying subgame will be an equilibrium if the government cannot
choose a better tax rate given the contribution functions it faces, and if each firm cannot
offer a contribution function that gives it a better payoff, given the function offered by the
other firm. More formally, given any f , a subgame perfect equilibrium of this lobbying game
is a tax rate τ ∗, and pair of contribution functions (C∗1(τ), C
∗
2(τ)) such that:
(i) For the government τ ∗ is a best response to (C∗1(τ), C
∗
2(τ)). That is,
τ ∗ ∈ arg max
τ∈R
W (τ) + λ(C∗1(τ) + C
∗
2(τ)).
(ii) For each firm i ∈ {1, 2}, C∗i (τ) is a best response to C∗j (τ). That is, there is no other
τ ′ and C ′i(τ) such that τ
′ is a best response to (C ′i(τ), C
∗
j (τ)) and pii(τ
′, f) − C ′i(τ ′) >
pii(τ
∗, f)− C∗i (τ ∗).
With no restrictions on Ci(·) this game has many equilibria. Following the now standard
approach in Grossman and Helpman (1994), equilibria are limited to those where firms offer
contribution functions of the form Ci(τ) = pii(τ) + ai, where ai is a constant. Bernheim
28The contribution function is formally equivalent to the kind of standard incentive contract offered in the
context of performance related pay. In reality lobbyists do not normally offer explicit contracts in such a
transparent way, but an implicit contract of this type underpins their use of political contributions to secure
favourable policies (see Grossman and Helpman (2001) for further discussion).
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and Whinston (1986) term such strategies ‘truthful strategies’ and show that the resulting
equilibria are focal among the set of all possible equilibria, since only they are stable to
non-binding communication.
I can now find the equilibria of the lobbying subgame following each choice of f ∈
{(G,G), (G,B), (B,B)}. First, consider the game following f = (G,G). As mentioned
above, the production outcomes (13) are independent of an emissions tax in this case, so no
firm will spend resources lobbying and the government can choose any tax, which has no
impact on welfare. The equilibrium outcomes are therefore τ ∈ R, c∗G(G,G) = 0.
Now consider the lobbying subgame that follows f = (G,B). Substituting profit functions
(13) into truthful contribution functions Ci(τ) = pi
∗
i (τ, (G,B))+ai, equilibrium condition (i)
gives the equilibrium emissions tax τ ∗(G,B). Condition (ii) gives the level of contribution
c∗i = C
∗
i (τ
∗) from each firm needed to maintain this as an equilibrium. The equilibrium tax
rate and two of its properties are:
τ ∗(G,B) =
8η + b(6η + bη − λ)
8(1− λ) + b(6− 4λ− bλ+ b) , τ
∗(G,B)|λ=0= η, d
dλ
τ ∗(G,B) > 0 (9)
The contributions c∗i (G,B) are given by equation (14) in Appendix A.1. To understand
this result, consider initially the case when openness to lobbying λ = 0. The government
maximises social welfare and ignores potential lobbying, giving outcome τ ∗ = η and c∗i = 0 for
each i; we see Pigouvian taxation and no political contributions.29 As λ increases, and so the
government becomes more open to lobbying, τ ∗ rises and so the tax rate increasingly exceeds
the Pigouvian level. This result is a consequence of Lemma 1 (that
∑
pii is increasing in τ
following f = (G,B)). The green firm would like a higher τ and so chooses a contribution
function that rewards the government for increasing τ , and the brown firm will likewise
reward the government for reducing τ . But by Lemma 1, the green firm gains more than the
29We would expect the Pigouvian tax because there is one market failure (environmental damage) and an
instrument (the emissions tax) which can implement the first best solution given the chosen technology f .
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brown firm loses from an increase in τ , so the green firm lobbies harder than the brown. That
is, the sum of the contributions will be increasing in τ and so in equilibrium the lobbying
distorts it upwards: the more the government is open to lobbying the more the green firm
gets its way. This result can be generalised in the following Lemma:
Lemma 2. Lobbying will distort emissions tax τ above the Pigouvian level if and only if total
industry profits are increasing in the emissions tax, that is τ ∗(f) > η ⇐⇒ d
dτ
∑
pi∗i (τ, f) > 0.
This result is very general since it holds for any f , any number of firms and any market
structure. A proof of Lemma 2 follows almost immediately from contribution functions
being truthful, so that
∑
Ci(τ) =
∑
pi∗i (τ)+a, where a is a constant. If the sum of profits is
increasing in τ then the sum of contributions will be too, so including it in the government’s
objective function (condition (i) above) will therefore increase the equilibrium tax above the
level optimal for social welfare alone. Lemma 2 also identifies when lobbying would distort
the emissions tax below the Pigouvian level: in any situation where the market structure is
such that
∑
pi∗i (τ) is decreasing in τ .
The interior equilibrium contributions c∗G and c
∗
B are strictly positive for λ > 0, and other
than this depend ambiguously on various parameters. This is because as λ rises, though the
firms have more influence and therefore are prepared to pay more to get a better outcome,
the government also needs less ‘compensation’ from firms for losses in social welfare resulting
from distortions in τ . In other words distorting the tax becomes cheaper. These two effects
tend to respectively increase and decrease c∗i as λ rises, hence overall the effect is ambiguous.
Now consider the lobbying subgame following f = (B,B). Following the same procedure
as above, equilibrium condition (i) gives the equilibrium emissions tax τ ∗(B,B) and condition
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(ii) gives the level of contributions. The tax rate is:
τ ∗(B,B) =
4η + bη − λ
4 + b− bλ , τ
∗(G,B)|λ=0= η, d
dλ
τ ∗(G,B) ≤ 0 (10)
and the contributions c∗B(B,B) are given in equation (14). As in the previous case, in the
absence of lobbying we see the government implement a Pigouvian tax. However, now the
firms gain from a lower tax, so as the government becomes more open to lobbying, the firms
push the tax below the Pigouvian level: d
dλ
τ ∗(G,B) ≤ 0.
Stage 1: Investment
Now consider the initial subgame, where each firm decides whether to invest in the new
green technology or keep the old brown technology, given their knowledge of how the game
will go following each decision.
Substituting profits (13) at tax rate and political contributions (14) into firm payoffs (6),
gives the reduced form payoffs for each firm following each investment outcome. The payoffs
are summarised in Table 1, and a full analytical description given in Appendix A.1.
Firm 2
G B
Firm 1
G
pi∗G(G,G)− s
pi∗G(G,G)− s
pi∗G(G,B)− c∗G(G,B)− s
pi∗B(G,B)− c∗B(G,B)
B
pi∗B(G,B)− c∗B(G,B)
pi∗G(G,B)− c∗G(G,B)− s
pi∗B(B,B)− c∗B(B,B)
pi∗B(B,B)− c∗B(B,B)
Table 1: Payoff matrix for the investment subgame. See Appendix A.1 for the full analytical
results.
The Nash equilibria of this reduced form game, along with quantities τ ∗ and {c∗i , x∗i }i∈{G,B},
are the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the whole game. An intuitive summary of the
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possible equilibria is as follows. If firms choose (G,G), then profits are high and symmet-
ric, no political contributions are made, and both firms pay green investment cost s. If
firms choose (B,B) then profits are low and symmetric, both firms lobby the emissions
tax below the Pigouvian level and both firms avoid the investment cost s. If firms choose
(G,B), then the green firm gains profits from increased market share and higher prices
(pi∗G(G,B) > pi
∗
B(B,B)), it must pay a political contribution (c
∗
G(G,B)) to push the tax
up and stop its opponent firm from pushing it down, and it must pay green investment
cost s. The brown firm loses profits from loss of market share and lower net of tax prices
(pi∗B(G,B) < pi
∗
G(G,G)), it must pay a political contribution (c
∗
B(G,B)) to keep the emissions
tax from being even higher, but it avoids investment cost s.
The equilibria of the investment subgame can now be found. The focus is on two equi-
libria: (G,B) and then (G,G).
3.1 The (G,B) equilibrium
The asymmetric equilibrium (G,B) is of particular interest,30 since this features political
conflict between the firms. Using the payoff matrix in Table 1, the no-deviation conditions
for the two firms are:
s ≤ pi∗G(G,B)− pi∗B(B,B)− c∗G(G,B) + c∗B(B,B) (11)
s ≥ pi∗G(G,G)− pi∗B(G,B) + c∗B(G,B) (12)
The (η, λ, b, s) parameter space that gives rise to the (G,B) equilibrium can now be
characterised. For any (η, λ, b), let S be the set of values of investment cost s that satisfy no-
deviation conditions (11) and (12). That is, let S = {s ∈ R : inequalities (11) and (12) hold}.
Denote by |S| the absolute size of S, so that it is the range of investment costs that leads to
30Given the symmetry of the firms, if (G,B) is an equilibrium then (B,G) will also be an equilibrium.
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(G,B) in equilibrium, and is a function of the remaining parameters, (λ, η, b). The following
proposition gives the first key results.
Proposition 1 (Existence of (G,B) equilibrium). For η sufficiently large, and b sufficiently
close to 0:
(i) The (G,B) equilibrium exists, that is S is non-empty.
(ii) The (G,B) equilibrium becomes more likely as the government becomes more open to
lobbying, that is d
dλ
|S|> 0.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
Proposition 1(i) confirms the intuition outlined in the Introduction that market share
considerations can indeed lead to one firm going green and the other staying brown. That
such an asymmetric equilibrium exists is not a foregone conclusion in a model like this, and
is therefore of interest. The setup of the model is symmetric in that the two firms are ex
ante identical, and yet in equilibrium they behave differently.31 Hence a firm needs no initial
technological advantage (or head start of any other kind) over their rival to find it profitable
to go green and lobby for increased market share.
Proposition 1(ii) shows that as λ rises, (G,B) becomes more likely, in the sense that
a greater range of parameters support this equilibrium. The intuition for this is that the
ability of firms to lobby makes green investment more attractive. The green firm is willing to
lobby harder than the brown firm for the emissions tax to rise, so τ is increasing in λ. This
extra lobbying results in an increase in profits that outweighs the increased lobbying bill,
so the green investment becomes more attractive. Hence, the firm will be willing to make
the green investment at higher costs s, tending to increase |S|. The brown firm’s behaviour
31The intuition for this is that the gain in market share from going green is decreasing in the number of
firms going green. Hence it may be profitable for a firm to choose G if the other has chosen B, but not if
the other has chosen G. Hence (G,B) is an equilibrium.
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will be impacted by rising λ too, since staying brown involves an ever larger loss of market
share, tending to decrease |S|. However, this loss is smaller than the green firm’s gain, so
the overall effect is an increase in |S|. Put another way, we find that corruption can increase
environmental protection.
These same results can be understood graphically, as shown in Figure 1a. The Figure
shows the regions of the (λ, s) parameter space that give rise to different investment choices
in equilibrium (holding η and b fixed). The solid line is the indifference curve of a firm whose
competitor has stayed brown (condition (11)). At points below the line, green investment
costs are low enough that it is profitable to go green, above the line it is better to stay brown.
The dashed line is the indifference curve of a firm whose competitor has gone green (condition
(12)), with optimal technology choices likewise above and below the line. As expected, when
green investment cost s is low, both firms prefer to go green since this requires only a small
investment and avoids market share being stolen by their competitor. As s rises one firm
will at some point find it profitable to stay brown, and eventually s will be so prohibitively
high both firms will prefer to stay brown.
Proposition 1(i) is demonstrated by the fact that the indifference curves lie one above the
other in the order they do: |S| is the vertical distance between the two lines. Proposition
1(ii) is demonstrated by the fact that the vertical space between the lines grows with λ.
These results indicate that there are situations where is it only because of lobbying that
the economy ends up in the (G,B) equilibrium. This insight can be formalised by defining
a new set. For any (η, λ, b), let S ′(λ) = S(λ) \ S(0). That is, S ′(λ) is the set of investment
costs that result in (G,B) when openness to lobbying is λ, but would not have given (G,B)
if λ were 0. It captures those situations were the outcome is (G,B) only because firms can
lobby. The following results can now be given.
Proposition 2 (Lobbying-induced transitions to (G,B)). For η sufficiently large and b
sufficiently close to 0, there exist investment costs s such that:
21
(a) b = 0 (b) b = 34
Figure 1: Equilibrium investment outcomes as a function of the parameter space (λ, s), for
η = 0.3. The solid line shows the indifference curve of a firm whose competitor has played
B, the dashed line likewise if the competitor has played G. Panel 1a is plotted for b = 0
and has an interior solution for λ ≤ 0.4. Panel 1b is plotted for b = 0.75 and has an interior
solution for λ ≤ 0.24.
(i) It is only because of lobbying that the economy is in equilibrium at (G,B) and not
(B,B), that is S ′ is non-empty.
(ii) A lobbying-induced transition from (B,B) to (G,B) becomes more likely as the govern-
ment becomes more open to lobbying, that is d
dλ
|S ′|> 0.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
The graphical representation of this Proposition in Figure 1a would be to draw a hori-
zontal line out from the λ = 0 point on the solid indifference curve. The wedge between this
line and the curve represents the set of investment costs for which the economy is tipped
into (G,B) only because of the ability of firms to lobby. Proposition 2(i) is demonstrated
by such a wedge existing, and Proposition 2(ii) is demonstrated by the size of the wedge
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increasing with λ.
In order to summarise these results and illustrate the importance of lobbying, consider
first an economy where the government is not at all open to lobbying, that is λ = 0, and
suppose green investment cost s is such that the economy is at point P in Figure 1a. A firm
thinking of going green knows that if it were to do so it would gain market share and increase
its profits due to the introduction of an emissions tax. But it also knows this emissions tax
(τ ∗ = η) will not be high enough to compensate it for the large green investment cost s, hence
the equilibrium is for all firms to stay brown and no environmental protection is achieved.
If, however, the government were to be somewhat open to lobbying, say λ = 1
4
, with the
same green investment cost the economy would be at point P ′. Now the firm considering
going green would reason that, if it were to invest in the green technology, it could use the
political process to push up the emissions tax (to τ ∗ = 4
3
η), and this would be sufficient to
cover the investment cost plus the political contribution needed to push up the tax. The
other firm would lobby too, in order to stop the emissions tax from being even higher, but it
would prefer to lose some market share rather than pay the green investment cost itself and
so will stay brown. Hence, it is only the ability of a firm to influence the political process
and secure a high emissions tax that enables it to invest in the green technology, and it is
only because of the firm’s political support that the government takes strong action on the
environment. The welfare implications of this are given in Proposition 4 below.
3.2 The (G,G) equilibrium
So far I have focused on the asymmetric (G,B) equilibrium, since it involves firm conflict
in the lobbying subgame. However the model may also help describe situations where all
firms make the green investment together and no market share ends up being fought over,
that is (G,G) is the equilibrium outcome. In this case, it is the threat of having its market
share stolen that will make each firm more likely to go green. Using a similar approach
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to Section 3.1, the properties of this equilibrium can be characterised. Let T be the set of
investment costs that lead to (G,G) in equilibrium. That is, for any (η, λ, b), let T = {s ∈ R :
inequality (12) holds}. Unlike in the previous case, the existence of the (G,G) equilibrium
should not itself be a surprising result: given small enough green investment costs, each firm
will prefer to make the small green investment in order to avoid emissions tax τ . I therefore
move straight to the question of whether lobbying makes the (G,G) outcome more likely, in
the sense that it expands the parameter space that supports this equilibrium.
For any (η, λ, b), let T ′(λ) = T (λ) \ T (0). That is, let T ′(λ) be the set of investment
costs that result in (G,G) when openness to lobbying is λ, but would not have given (G,G)
if λ were 0. T captures those situations where (G,G) is the outcome only because firms can
lobby. The following results can now be given.
Proposition 3 (Lobbying-induced transitions to (G,G)). For any η, and b sufficiently close
to 0, there exist investments costs s such that:
(i) It is only because of lobbying that the economy is in equilibrium at (G,G), that is T ′ is
non-empty.
(ii) A lobbying-induced transition from (G,B) to (G,G) becomes more likely as the govern-
ment becomes more open to lobbying, that is d
dλ
|T ′|> 0.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
Proposition 3 shows that there are situations where it is only because firms can lobby
that the economy ends up in (G,G) rather than (G,B), and that these situations become
more likely as the government becomes more open to lobbying. The intuition for this is as
follows. The more firms can lobby, the further the tax will be distorted above the Pigouvian
level following (G,B), and hence the more market share a firm will lose if it stays brown
while its rival goes green. The threat of an increasingly damaging emissions tax means firms
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become increasingly willing to go green as λ rises. This point is made graphically in Figure
1a. An economy with no lobbying is shown at point Q, and is in equilibrium at (G,B). An
otherwise identical economy except that the government is more open to lobbying is shown
at point Q′, and is in equilibrium at (G,G). This result formalises the idea that, even when
all firms in an industry go green together in a seemingly ‘cooperative’ way, it may well be
that it is only the threat of losing substantial market share that keeps each individual firm
from deviating. The welfare consequences of this are given in Proposition 5 below.
3.3 The high elasticity case
The above results are derived analytically and shown graphically in Figure 1a using the case
where b = 0. Since all the relevant expressions are continuous in b at b = 0 (see Appendix
A.2), the results continue to hold analytically for b close to 0. The length of the relevant
analytical expressions when b 6= 0 (see Appendix A.1) makes closed form versions of the
above and subsequent results more difficult to work with, but I argue here that all the
results do continue to hold as b rises, though for increasingly narrow parameter spaces.
First, note that Lemma 1 holds for all b, but that d
db
d
dτ
∑
pi∗i (τ, (G,B)) < 0. Hence, at
higher b the tax does still increase total profits, but by a smaller amount. Intuitively, when
the total size of the market is very price sensitive, the green firm has less to gain from a
price rise because the corresponding fall in quantity is large: the market stealing effect is
somewhat offset by a market size effect. This means the equilibrium tax τ ∗(G,B)) falls in
b, and approaches the Pigouvian level. Hence the ability of firms to lobby becomes less
important as b rises.
This point in made graphically in Figure 1b, which is plotted for b = 3
4
. The (G,B)
equilibrium still exists and becomes more likely as λ rises (Proposition 1), though for a
smaller parameter space than in the b = 0 case. Likewise, lobbying-induced transitions to
(G,B) and to (G,G) exist and become more likely as λ rises (Propositions 2 and 3), though
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for a smaller parameter space than in the b = 0 case.
These results demonstrate that lobbying that supports environmental regulation is most
likely to occur in industries where the demand elasticity is low. If it is too high, strong
environmental protection shrinks the market too much, offsetting any firm’s potential gain
in market share and therefore making green investments less attractive.
4 Welfare
Section 3 showed that the ability of firms to lobby can cause the economy to end up in
a greener equilibrium than in the absence of lobbying. In this section I ask whether these
lobbying-induced transitions are welfare improving. In each case there are trade-offs between
increased environmental protection on the one hand, and investment costs and distortions
to the production profile of the economy as a result of lobbying on the other.
Using equilibrium outcomes (13) and taxes and contributions (14) in welfare equation
(4), define an indirect welfare function W (f) that depends only on technology profile f .
Then define social preference  over technology profiles f ∈ {G,B}2 as follows: for any two
technology profiles f, f ′ ∈ {G,B}2, f  f ′ if and only if W (·) minus any green investment
costs is higher for f than f ′.
4.1 The (G,B) equilibrium
It can now be asked when transitioning from (B,B) to (G,B), for example from P to P ′ in
Figure 1a, is socially preferable. Using the above definitions, (G,B)  (B,B) if and only if
W (G,B)− s > W (B,B). For any (η, λ, b), let Y = {s ∈ R : (G,B)  (B,B)}. Y is the set
of investment costs for which the greener (G,B) is socially preferred to the dirtier alternative
(B,B). Recall that S ′ is the set of investment costs for which the economy transitions to
(G,B) from (B,B). Hence, all such lobbying-induced transitions will be socially preferable
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if any economy in S ′ is also in Y , that is if S ′ ⊂ Y .
Proposition 4 (Welfare of lobbying-induced transitions to (G,B)). For b sufficiently close
to 0, any lobbying-induced transition from (B,B) to (G,B) is socially preferable, that is
S ′ ⊂ Y .
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
To understand this result, consider the social costs of moving from (B,B) to (G,B). In
the (B,B) equilibrium, firms produce an equal share of output but they lobby the tax below
the Pigouvian level, resulting in too much environmental damage. In the (G,B) equilibrium,
lobbying distorts the tax above the Pigouvian level, which reduces environmental damage.
But it also distorts the production profile of the economy, both by giving the green firm
more than its efficient market share (convex cost functions making this socially undesirable)
and also by shrinking total output below the optimal level (for b > 0).
Proposition 4 shows that if the green investment cost s is large enough to induce a
transition from (B,B) to (G,B), then the net gain in welfare, from reduced environmental
damage plus increased product market distortion, more than compensates for s. All such
transitions are therefore socially preferable.
4.2 The (G,G) equilibrium
The same welfare analysis can be conducted on the transition from (G,B) to the greener
(G,G) equilibrium. (G,G)  (G,B) holds if and only if W (G,G) − s > W (G,B). For
any (η, λ, b), let Z = {s ∈ R : (G,G)  (G,B)}. Recall T ′ is the set of investment costs
for which lobbying induces the economy to be in (G,G) rather than (G,B). Hence any
lobbying-induced transition will be socially preferable if all economies in T ′ are also in Z,
that is if T ′ ⊂ Z.
Proposition 5 (Welfare of lobbying-induced transitions to (G,G)). For b sufficiently close
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to 0, any lobbying-induced transition from (G,B) to (G,G) is socially preferable, that is
T ′ ⊂ Z.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
This result is perhaps less surprising than the previous proposition. As outlined above,
the (G,B) outcome features product market distortions, both in the firms’ shares of produc-
tion and total output. In contrast, there is no product market distortion in the (G,G) case,
since both firms have clean production technologies and so output is shared evenly and at
the socially optimal level. Moving from (G,B) to (G,G), therefore, reduces both environ-
mental damage and product market distortions. Hence, if the investment cost is such that a
lobbying-induced transition occurs, it will be more than compensated for by the above two
welfare gains.
5 Extensions and robustness
5.1 Generalisation to n firms
In this section I generalise the model by allowing the number of firms to be any n ∈ N.
The results for the special case of n = 2 characterised in the previous sections are shown to
qualitatively hold in the more general case. Let nG be the number of firms that chose fi = G
in stage 1. Solving the model in an analogous way to the n = 2 case in Section 3 gives
equilibrium outcomes as a function of nG at each stage. The details are given in Appendix
A.3. For simplicity, I consider the b = 0 case.
Proposition 6 (n-firm equilibrium existence). For any η, λ sufficiently close to 0, and any
n ∈ N:
(i) Any number of green firms can be supported as the unique equilibrium. That is, for all
nG ∈ {0, ..., n} there exist regions of (η, λ, s) space such that S(nG) is non-empty.
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(ii) The equilibrium number of green firms n∗G decreases with the green investment cost s.
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
The results in the above proposition are demonstrated graphically in Figure 2, plotted
with n = 5. Like Figure 1a, this shows which regions of the (λ, s) parameter space give
rise to different n∗G equilibria. Proposition 6(i) is demonstrated by each number of green
firms nG ∈ {1, ..., n} being supported by some different green investment s for small λ.
Proposition 6(ii) is demonstrated by the number of firms going green in equilibrium falling
as the green investment becomes more expensive, for intuitively straightforward reasons.
Analogous comparative statics to those given in many of the Propositions 1-5 can also be
derived in the n-firm case, and some are illustrated graphically in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Equilibrium outcomes as a function of the parameter space (λ, s), plotted for n = 5
and with η = 0.2 and b = 0.
The n-firm case more closely describes the real world examples discussed in the Intro-
duction. In the case of the ozone layer and DuPont, n∗G = 1 and n ≈ 5, with just DuPont
lobbying for environmental protection and a handful of others opposing. In the case of cli-
29
mate change and the European oil and gas companies, n∗G = 6 and n is large. However, the
key insights gained from the two-firm model remain largely unchanged in the n-firm case.
5.2 Cournot and other models of competition
The baseline model assumes firms take prices as given. As discussed, by abstracting away
from strategic product market behaviour, this allows the model to focus cleanly on the polit-
ical and investment stages of the game. The results, however, are robust to this assumption.
In this section I outline the solution to the model with Cournot competition in the production
stage. Appendix A.4 contains further details.
Consider the setup outlined in Section 2, and now suppose firms know that prices depend
on quantity according to demand equation (3). Substituting this into their profit equations
and maximising gives equilibrium outputs such that Lemma 1 continues to hold. In the
lobbying stage, compared to the previous case, the equilibrium taxes are distorted down-
wards, as the government addresses the market failure resulting from Cournot competition.
This use of an environmental tax as an instrument of competition policy complicates the
solutions, but they retain the key properties needed for the final results: τ ∗(G,G) ∈ R,
d
dλ
τ ∗(G,B) > 0, and d
dλ
τ ∗(B,B) < 0. Solving the investment stage establishes that the
(G,B) equilibrium exists and becomes more likely as λ increases. The remaining results are
best obtained graphically.32
A final point to make about market structure is a more general one. Abstracting away
from specific assumptions, the results found here will qualitatively hold so long as total
profits are increasing in the government’s environmental protection instrument. Instead of
a tax, this instrument could most obviously be a reduction in permits under a cap and
32The model can be re-solved for other competitive environments. Hotelling competition gives particularly
concise analytical solutions. Again, the results continue to hold, though they are inevitably made more
complex by the government using the emissions tax as an instrument of competition policy as well as
environmental policy.
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trade scheme. Hepburn et al. (2013) characterise quite general conditions under which the
equivalent of d
dτ
∑
pi∗i > 0 holds. That it does often hold should not be too surprising a
result: environmental protection frequently involves putting a price on externalities where
previously there was none, generating environmental rents which can at least partially accrue
to firms. Hence, though environmental regulation can sometimes shrink markets, getting a
share of the new rents often ensures the winners gain more than the losers lose. Therefore
Lemma 1 or its equivalent is arguably a more general property of economies than might
initially be supposed.
6 Conclusion
This paper presented a simple model of environmental protection in a situation where firms
can lobby the government over the level of an emissions tax and use it as a means to
potentially steal market share from their competitors. The paper focused on the equilibrium
where one firm goes green, lobbies for a high emissions tax and gains market share from its
rival, who stays brown and lobbies to try to lower the tax. The equilibrium tax is increasingly
distorted above the Pigouvian level as the government becomes more open to lobbying. I
show there are situations where it is only because of lobbying that the economy ends up
with one green firm instead of none. The equilibrium where both firms go green is also
characterised, and here the threat of loss of market share helps to sustain the equilibrium.
In both cases, lobbying-induced transitions to a greener economy are welfare improving.
The findings in this paper illustrate some broader points concerning the political economy
of environmental protection. First, and rarely discussed, is that we ought to think more
carefully about why there might be conflict between corporate interests and environmental
protection, and whether it is inevitable. Certainly profit maximising behaviour, particularly
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when it comes to minimising costs,33 can mean these two forces pull in opposite directions.
But the creation of environmental rents and the opportunity to use regulation to gain a
competitive advantage over a rival are both powerful reasons for profit maximising firms to
support environmental protection. Such political support can have a major impact on the
extent to which the environment is protected.
Second, the market share considerations explored in this paper may be important in a
international context too. If one of the two firms in the (G,B) case were foreign owned, then
the welfare component of the government’s objective function would clearly change. This
could explain the especially strong US support for regulation in the case of ozone, or the
reluctance of the US to agree to stronger climate policies given that EU firms often made
more substantial investments in low-carbon technologies than US firms.
I have argued this model explains some otherwise puzzling examples of environmental
lobbying by polluting firms. However, the model is also a bad predictor of the political
economy of environmental protection much of the time - since polluting industries are often
united in opposing regulation - a fact which is itself interesting since it suggests that there
may be other important effects at work. Three potentially plausible frictions that would
generate this result are as follows.
The first, and perhaps most interesting, explanation could be collusion. Firm collusion
in the product market has been extensively studied, but it is not the only arena in which
firms may be more or less competitive. The model presented here features a competitive
political stage (in the sense that lobbying is non-cooperative), but perhaps in reality the
firms collude, at least to some extent. The determinants of political collusion by firms might
perhaps be similar to the determinants of product market collusion. It may therefore be
expected that concentrated, established industries that cooperate on other matters might
33The 1984 Union Carbide chemical leak in Bhopal was a particularly deadly and long lasting environmental
disaster (see Dhara and Dhara (2002)). Aggressive cost cutting is often said to be its cause, as it was with
the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
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here collude politically and stay brown rather than maximise their individual profits and
go green. Conversations I have had with both industry and environmental lobbyists often
emphasise the practical importance of Trade Associations, the industry-wide lobby groups
through which much of each firm’s lobbying in reality takes place. In order to function,
these institutions foster consensus and cooperation among their members, or, in other words,
collusion. Firms’ lobbyists are often not keen to deviate from a collusive outcome, either for
rational repeated game-type reasons, or perhaps for ingrained social and institutional ones.34
A second plausible explanation could be due to uncertainty over government policy. The
green firm needs the tax to stay in place and not be changed by future governments, which is
the case by construction in the simple model presented here. In reality, however, governments
behave less predictably and newly elected governments, for example, often cancel taxes or
subsidies introduced by their predecessors. Going green is therefore a risky investment, and
companies may decide they don’t want the uncertainty in their revenues and may rationally
choose to stay brown. Third, it may be that (due to small asymmetries not modelled above)
the firms that stand to lose are large incumbents, and those that stand to gain are either small
incumbents or entrants. Such firms are likely to be liquidity constrained in their lobbying
activities, and may face other barriers to lobbying such as less developed networks with
policymakers. Under such constraints, lobbying would not in equilibrium produce a large
enough environmental tax for a firm to choose to go green. Whatever the exact mechanism,
some additional friction or imperfection is needed before it can be shown that corporate
lobbying inevitably harms the environment. Given this may often have large consequences,
further, perhaps empirical, work in this area may be fruitful.
34Wider social and cultural factors may also play a role in determining the extent of collusion, for example in
explaining why European oil and gas producers lobbied for a carbon price in 2015 when their US counterparts
did not.
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A Appendix
A.1 Full analytical solutions to the subgames
x1 x2 p pi1 pi2
(G,G) 2
b+4
2
b+4
1
b+4
1
(b+4)2
1
(b+4)2
(G,B) 4τ+2
b+4
2−(2+b)2τ
b+4
2τ+1
b+4
(2τ+1)2
(b+4)2
(1−(2+b)τ)2
(b+4)2
(B,B) 2(1−bτ)
b+4
2(1−bτ)
b+4
4τ+1
b+4
(1−bτ)2
(b+4)2
(1−bτ)2
(b+4)2
Production subgame equilibrium outcomes (13)
τ ∗ c∗1 c
∗
2
(G,G) ∈ R 0 0
(G,B) 8η+b(6η+bη−λ)
8(1−λ)+b(6−4λ−bλ+b)
4λ(b+2)(2η−λ+1)2
(b−2λ−bλ+4)(8λ−6b+4bλ+b2λ−b2−8)2
λ(b+2)2(2λ−b+4η+4bη+b2η−2)2
(b2+6b−4λ+8)(8λ−6b+4bλ+b2λ−b2−8)2
(B,B) 4η+bη−λ
4+(1−λ)b
bλ(bη−1)2
(2b−bλ+8)(b−bλ+4)2
bλ(bη−1)2
(2b−bλ+8)(b−bλ+4)2
Lobbying subgame equilibrium outcomes (14)
G B
G
1
(b+4)2
− s
1
(b+4)2
− s
(b+2)(2η−λ+1)2
−(b−2λ−bλ+4)(8λ−6b+4bλ+b2λ−b2−8) − s
(2λ−b+4η+4bη+b2η−2)2
(−6b+8λ+4bλ+b2λ−b2−8)(−6b+4λ−b2−8)
B
(2λ−b+4η+4bη+b2η−2)2
(−6b+8λ+4bλ+b2λ−b2−8)(−6b+4λ−b2−8)
(b+2)(2η−λ+1)2
−(b−2λ−bλ+4)(8λ−6b+4bλ+b2λ−b2−8) − s
2(bη−1)2(b+4)
(2b−bλ+8)(b−bλ+4)2
2(bη−1)2(b+4)
(2b−bλ+8)(b−bλ+4)2
Investment subgame payoff matrix (15)
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A.2 Proofs
Lemma 1
Proof. Using production equilibrium outcomes (13), we find d
dτ
∑
pii(τ, (G,B)) =
2(8τ−b+4bτ+b2τ)
(b+4)2
,
which is positive if τ > b
4b+b2+8
∈ [0,
√
2−1
4
] for all b ∈ R≥0. The results from the next stage
verify that, in the equilibria of interest, τ always satisfies the above inequality.
Proposition 1
Proof. (i) There are parameters for which S is non-empty if |S|> 0. Let ss = maxS,
obtained by substituting values from payoff matrix (15) into no-deviation condition (11).
Likewise let ss = minS, obtained by substituting values from payoff matrix (15) into no-
deviation condition (12). |S|= ss−ss, but the full analytical expression for |S| and subsequent
quantities is long, so I proceed in this and the next two proofs as follows. First, I demonstrate
the relevant result at b = 0. Second, if the relevant expression is continuous in b at b = 0,
then any result true at b = 0 must also be true for b close to 0. Proceeding in this way,
|S|b=0= λ2−λ+8η28(1−λ)(2−λ) , which is positive if η > (λ(1−λ)8 )
1
2 . η >
√
2
8
≈ 0.18 guarantees |S|> 0 for
all λ ∈ R≥0 that give an interior solution. Finally, limb→0(|S|) = |S|b=0, so |S| is continuous
in b at b = 0.
(ii) Differentiating gives d
dλ
|S|∣∣
b=0
= (12−8λ)η
2−(1−λ)2
4(1−λ)2(2−λ)2 which is positive for η >
1−λ
2(3−2λ)1/2 .
η >
√
3
6
≈ 0.29 guarantees d
dλ
|S|> 0 for all λ ∈ R≥0 that give an interior solution. Finally,
limb→0( ddλ |S|) = |S|b=0, so ddλ |S| is continuous in b at b = 0.
Proposition 2
Proof. (i) S ′ is non-empty if |S ′|> 0, where |S ′(λ)|= ss(λ) − ss(0). Using maximum in-
vestment cost ss(λ) from the above proof, |S ′|b=0= 8η+λ2−λ+8η2−8λη16(1−λ)(2−λ) . Hence |S ′|> 0 if
η > λ−1+
√
2
√−3λ+λ2+2
2(3−λ) ; η >
1
6
ensures this holds for all λ ∈ R≥0 that gives an interior
solution. Finally, limb→0(|S ′|) = |S|b=0, so |S ′| is continuous in b at b = 0.
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(ii) Differentiating and then setting b = 0 gives d
dλ
|S ′|∣∣
b=0
= (2η+1−λ)(λ+6η−4λη−1)
8(1−λ)2(2−λ)2 . This is
positive if η > 1−λ
2(3−2λ) ; η >
1
6
ensures this holds for all λ ∈ R≥0 that gives an interior
solution. Finally, limb→0( ddλ |S ′|) = ddλ |S ′|
∣∣
b=0
, so d
dλ
|S ′| is continuous in b at b = 0.
Proposition 3
Proof. The form of the proof is the same as for Proposition 2. (i) T ′ is non-empty if |T ′|> 0,
where |T ′(λ)|= sT (λ) − sT (0) and sT = max T ′. Substituting payoff matrix (15) into no-
deviation condition (11) gives sT , which then gives |T ′|b=0= λ(4η−λ−12η2−4λη+4λη2+1)16(1−λ)(2−λ) . Hence
|T ′|> 0 if η > 1−λ+
√
2
√
(1−λ)(2−λ)
2(3−λ) , which holds for all (λ, η) ∈ R2≥0 that give an interior
solution. Finally, limb→0(|T ′|) = |T |b=0, so |T ′| is continuous in b at b = 0.
(ii) Differentiating and then setting b = 0 gives d
dλ
|T ′|= (1−λ+6η−4λη)(1−λ−2η)
8(1−λ)2(2−λ)2 . Again this is
positive if η < 1−λ
2
, which holds for all (λ, η) ∈ R2≥0 that give an interior solution. Finally,
limb→0( ddλ |T ′|) = ddλ |T ′|
∣∣
b=0
, so d
dλ
|T ′| is continuous in b at b = 0.
Proposition 4
Proof. Let sY = max Y , that is sY is the largest investment cost for which (G,B) 
(B,B). S ′ ⊂ Y when sY > sS. Using indirect welfare function W (f), we can calculate
sY = W (G,B) − W (B,B). The limits as b → 0 are limb→0(sY ) = η(−2λ+η+λ2−2λη+1)2(λ−1)2 and
limb→0(sS) =
(λ2−λ+8η2)
8(λ2−3λ+2) . Using these results, in the b → 0 limit, sY (λ) > sS holds if
(16λ2 − 32λ + 8)η2 + (24λ2 − 8λ3 − 24λ + 8)η + (λ3 − 2λ2 + λ) > 0. Solving for η, it can
be shown that this holds for any (λ, η) ∈ R2≥0 that give an interior solution. Note that at
b = 0, for welfare analysis we must use the part of the utility function specified in footnote
21. This then ensures continuity in all the relevant expressions at b = 0.
Proposition 5
Proof. Let sZ = max Z, that is sZ is the largest investment cost for which (G,G) 
(G,B). T ′ ⊂ Z when sZ > sT . Using indirect welfare function W (f), we can calculate
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sZ = W (G,G) − W (G,B). The limits as b → 0 are limb→0(sZ) = η(−2λ−η+λ2+2λη+1)2(1−λ)2 and
limb→0(sT ) =
λ−λ2−8λη−8η2+8η
16(1−λ)(2−λ) . Using these results, in the b → 0 limit, sZ > sT holds if η ∈
[ (1−λ)(−4λ+2λ
2+1−√2L(λ))
4(2λ2−4λ+1) ,
(1−λ)(−4λ+2λ2+1+√2L(λ))
4(2λ2−4λ+1) ] where L(λ) =
√−9λ+ 16λ2 − 10λ3 + 2λ4 + 2.
Any η giving an interior solution lies in the above interval. Note that at b = 0, for welfare
analysis we must use the part of the utility function specified in footnote 21. This then
ensures continuity in all the relevant expressions at b = 0.
A.3 Generalisation to n firms
Stage 3: Production
Let nG be the number of firms that chose fi = G in stage 1. The investment profile
f ∈ {G,B}n is therefore summarised by nG. Given nG and tax τ chosen in stages 1 and 2,
firms choose their level of output xi to maximise their profits. Assuming all firms that made
the same investment choice behave in the same way, and denoting as before variables for a
firm that chose fi = G with a G subscript and those that chose fi = B with a B subscript,
the stage 3 equilibrium is given by outputs x∗G(τ, nG), x
∗
B(τ, nG), with corresponding prices
and profits p∗(τ, nG), pi∗G(τ, nG), pi
∗
B(τ, nG). As before, any firm that has gone green gains
from a higher tax and those that stayed brown gain from a lower tax. Lemma 1 continues
to hold since the sum of all firms profits is increasing in τ .
Stage 2: Lobbying
Knowing how a tax will impact their profits and taking nG as given, the firms non-
cooperatively choose their lobbying contribution functions Ci(τ).
35 The government max-
imises a weighted sum of social welfare and political contributions as before. The equilibrium
35For example, all the green firms don’t form a special interest group and coordinate their lobbying. This
implicitly assumes the firms have not solved the collective action problem that prevents them from colluding
at the lobbying stage. This issue is briefly discussed in Section 6.
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is an emissions tax τ ∗ and pair of contribution functions (C∗G(τ), C
∗
B(τ)) that satisfy the two
equilibrium conditions set out in Section 3. When b = 0, solving gives τ ∗(nG) =
η
1−λ , and
values of c∗i (nG) that are generalisations of the n = 2 case. As in the two firm case, lobbying
results in the emissions tax being increasingly distorted above the Pigouvian level. This is a
consequence of Lemma 2, which it was previously noted holds for any n and therefore applies
in this setting.
Stage 1: Investment
Having shown that green firms will successfully lobby to distort the emissions tax above
the Pigouvian level, it only remains to show that some firms will in equilibrium choose to
go green in the investment stage. An equilibrium of the investment subgame is a profile of
choices f ∈ {G,B}n, or equivalently a value of nG ∈ {0, ..., n}, such that no firm gains from
unilaterally deviating. That is, given the choices of the other firms, no firm choosing G could
gain from deviating to B and no firm choosing B could gain from deviating to G, as given
respectively by
pi∗G(nG)− c∗G(nG)− s ≥ pi∗B(nG − 1)− c∗B(nG − 1) (16)
pi∗B(nG)− c∗B(nG) ≥ pi∗G(nG + 1)− c∗G(nG + 1)− s (17)
An equilibrium is a value of nG that satisfies both equations. In principle all the results in
the propositions in Section 3 can be replicated using the equations derived in this section,
but most of the analytical solutions are not tractable. I therefore present, in the main
body of the article, the small λ case analytically, and then give a graphical example of the
more general case to demonstrate the comparative statics. Following Section 3, define set
S(nG) = {s ∈ R≥0 : nG satisfies (16) and (17)}. That is, S(nG) is the set of investment costs
that supports nG firms going green in equilibrium. Proposition 6 can now be stated.
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Proposition 6
Proof. Part (i): Consider the case where λ = 0, giving |S(nG)|= 2η2n2 (n − 1), which is inde-
pendent of nG. |S(nG)|> 0 therefore holds for all nG and any n ≥ 2. limλ→0(|S(nG)|) =
|S(nG)|λ=0, so |S(nG)| is continuous in λ at λ = 0, hence the above results continue to hold
for small λ. Part (ii): follows from |S(nG)|= 2η2n2 (n − 1) when λ = 0, and |S(nG)| being
continuous in λ at λ = 0.
A.4 Cournot competition
Consider a set up identical to that in Section 2, except that each firm maximises its profits
believing that its own and the other firm’s output affects prices according to demand equation
(3). For analytical simplicity, consider the b = 1 case. Solving in exactly the same way as in
Section 3, we get:
ss =
11 005λ+ 13 836η + 14 375λ2 − 53 125λ3 + 15 625λ4 + 582η2 −
33 750λ2η2 − 83 260λη + 17 880λη2 + 112 500λ2η − 12 500λ3η − 3168
5(λ− 1)(λ− 2)(145λ− 47)(125λ− 47)
,
(18)
ss =
25(−400λ2 − 4900λη + 605λ− 6125η2 + 5390η − 744)
49(47− 145λ)(47− 20λ) (19)
Using these and subsequent expressions, we can obtain the results in the Propositions in the
main text, though given the analytical length of these expressions, numerical examples are
the easiest way to establish many of the existence results.
A.5 Corner solutions
A corner solution in the production subgame is a possibility following f = (G,B). If the
emissions tax τ is high enough then the brown firm will want to choose negative output by
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(13) when τ > 1
b+2
. Given equilibrium tax rates (14) from the lobbying stage, we have a
corner solution if η > b−2λ+2
4b+b2+4
. Intuitively, if the environmental problem is too severe, the
government will want to set a tax that entirely prohibits polluting production. The corner
solution to the production and lobbying subgames is given by:
x∗G(G,B) =
2
b+′ 2
, x∗B(G,B) = 0, pi
∗
G(G,B) =
1
(b+ 2)2
, pi∗B(G,B) = 0
τ ∗(G,B) =
1
b+ 2
, c∗G(G,B) =
(2η + bη − 1)2
λ(b+ 2)(b− 2λ− bλ+ 4) , c
∗
B(G,B) = 0
(20)
These results can then be substituted into production outcomes (13) and welfare equation
(4) to give investment subgame reduced form payoffs. The corner solutions do not feature
in the analytical results, but they are shown in the graphical results.
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